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Abstract 
This paper examines an under-investigated area in relationship banking, 
i.e. the use of bank advice/support and its impacts on the financial 
conditions of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The findings 
indicate that the characteristics of businesses and entrepreneurs, amongst 
other factors, have determinant effects on the use of bank support by 
SMEs, when they make financial decisions. SMEs can significantly 
alleviate the severity of their financial problems by using bank support 
more fully, through developing long-term relationships with banks as 
primary network partners. It further recognises the value of advice from 
banks being a substitute for entrepreneurial human capital, especially 
when bankers use ‘private information’ to determine the nature and level 
of financial and non-financial assistance that they are prepared to supply 
to their clients.  
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21. Introduction 
Commercial banks are the primary suppliers of financial products to small and medium 
size enterprises (SMEs) (Mach and Wolken, 2006), providing a wide range of financial 
services to their SME customers, such as support and advice on financial issues. From 
the demand side, the use of bank advice has been found to fill gaps in internal staff or 
management expertise to develop new internal procedures or processes (Robson and 
Bennett, 2000). This aspect can also be seen from the perspective of SMEs periodically 
having and recognising weaknesses of insufficient human capital and using bank-client 
relationships accordingly.  From the supply side, the provision of advice by banks is not 
subject to strict regulatory control (Bennett and Robson, 1999) and has been argued that 
it can draw on the basis of the trust and confidence clients have in them, their 
approachability and the information flow to the clients as a result of banks’ financial 
dealings with customers (Han and Benson, 2010). Extant literature has suggested that the 
use and provision of support, or advice by bankers, is often a form of ‘institutional trust’ 
which is developed through long term relationship banking.  
In the research area of SME finance, extensive studies have been pursued to investigate 
lending by banks to SMEs from three major aspects: banks (e.g. Devaney and Webber, 
2002; Craig and Thomson, 2003), SME borrowers (e.g. Fraser, 2009), and the 
relationship between banks and SME customers (e.g. Akhavein et al., 2004; Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002). ‘Relationship lending’ is critical to the financing of SMEs and its 
importance has been extensively confirmed by extant research into the funding of 
entrepreneurial ventures. Much of the available research data provided to date, in this 
area, has derived from four approaches. Firstly, it has reviewed the impacts of the 
3duration of the relationships between banks and SMEs, on the availability of bank 
finance (e.g. Ono and Uesugi, 2009) and its cost (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995). Secondly, 
it has sought to examine the way in which banking relationships have impacted on the 
provision of SME finance through ‘business characteristics’ (e.g. Han et al., 2009a) and 
entrepreneurial ‘demographic profiles’ (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al, 2002). Thirdly, there has 
been a concentration upon the level of embeddedness of the relationship between banks 
and their clients (e.g. Kang et al., forthcoming). Fourthly, it has examined the role played 
by the market conditions for SME finance, e.g. market concentration (Han et al., 2009b).  
Most empirical studies employ materials from the US, historically having had a 
geographically fragmented banking system and despite the merger and acquisition 
process in banking sector undergoing internationally, and particularly in the US, this 
remains very fragmented by international standards and different from the UK1. In 
contrast, the UK has a generally centralised banking system. In the case of UK SME 
finance the big-4 banks2 are the main banks for 78% of SMEs and in Scotland they have 
95% of the market (Fraser, 2005). Even though there is less empirical evidence on small 
firm relationship banking in UK, it has been reported that relationship banking is equally 
important for UK SMEs in terms of alleviating financial problems, for instance (Han, 
2008). In a research project on small business credit market discrimination, Fraser (2009) 
reports that there is no ethnic discrimination in UK markets and the ethnic differences in 
the availability and price of small business finance can be interpreted by variations in 
non-ethnic risk factors.  
1 We appreciate an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
2 They are Barclays PLC, HSBC Holdings PLC, Lloyds Banking Group PLC. and Royal Bank of  Scotland 
Group PLC. 
4It has been widely accepted that small firms make great contributions to regional 
economic development and the creation of jobs. It has also been noticed that small firms 
are more likely to raise external capital locally because of the high transaction costs 
incurred. Therefore, geography plays an important role in small business finance in terms 
of costs of private information collection, monitoring and etc. For example, local 
financial development enhances the probability of business start-up and promotes 
growth (Guiso et al., 2004) and the highly centralised UK banking system may well 
introduce spatial bias in the flows of capital to SMEs (Klagge and Martin, 2005). In Italy, 
because of the concentration of bank decisional centres, the functional distance between 
banks and local firms has been widened and as a result, it makes local borrowers’ 
financial constraints more binding (Alessandrini et al. 2009).  
Moreover, the geography in SME finance also has strong implications on economic rent 
creation and the problem of asymmetric information (e.g. Degryse and Ogena, 2005) 
which is essential to gaining an understanding the financial behaviour of small businesses, 
generally supposed to be ‘informationally opaque’. Theoretically, with the problem of 
asymmetric information, small business borrowers would be either credit rationed 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or offered a ‘menu of contracts’ (Bester, 1985). The empirical 
implications of asymmetric information theory for small business finance are, firstly, 
creditworthy small businesses may under invest, if they cannot raise the capital they need 
and/or at a price they can afford. Secondly, because of information asymmetries, non-
creditworthy small businesses may over invest if their loan applications are mistakenly 
approved by lenders. It has been widely recognised that relationship lending could help 
to alleviate the problem of asymmetric information (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In 
particular, the relationships between banks and their SME customers have been 
5understood as, and studied in, the following three aspects: (1) length of the relationship 
(e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994),  (2) distance between banks and borrowers (e.g. Degryse 
and Ogena, 2005), (3) embeddedness of the relationship (e.g. Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003, 
from the side of banks), (4) concentration of the relationships (e.g. Detragiache et al, 
2000; Han et al., 2008), and (5) communication approaches between banks and their SME 
customers (e.g. Han and Greene, 2007). However, there is an under-investigation of the 
impacts of external assistance provided, especially that of bank support, via relationship 
banking. It has been well reported that financial constraints have a major impact on the 
‘survivability’ of SMEs and ultimately may be a significant causal factor of their ultimate 
failure (Saridakis et al., 2008).  
By analysing the 2004 U.K Survey of SME Finances with 2500 sample firms, this paper 
examines the use of bank support services and their impacts, via relationship banking, on 
the lessening, or otherwise, of the severity of financial problems encountered by UK-
based SMEs prior to the ongoing and unresolved EU funding crisis. This paper 
contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, by complementing the existing 
literature on the use and the effectiveness of the available public support programmes, 
such as Business Link, we investigate the use and impacts of assistance from the private 
sector – banks. Secondly, our empirical results reinforce the importance of the level and 
quality of an entrepreneur’s human capital on the financial health of small business. We 
thus highlight the important role played by bank support to compensate for the lack of 
sufficient human capital. Thirdly, contributing to the literature in relationship banking, 
this paper offers evidence that the favourable relationship effects in alleviating SME 
financial problems are much stronger for bank support users, rather than non-users. 
6The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews literature on information 
asymmetries and relationship banking. Section 3 develops research hypotheses by 
examining the extant literature on external assistance and the observed relationships 
between banks and their SME clients. Section 4 describes the methodology and data 
employed. Section 5 presents the findings. Section 6 concludes and considers the 
implications for overcoming the inertia of entrepreneurs in both seeking and responding 
to advice available from professional business advisors. 
2. Asymmetric Information and Relationship Banking 
Asymmetric information is central to gaining a greater understanding of the particular 
relationships between banks and their SME clients. The asymmetry occurs because bank 
lenders are generally assumed to have less meaningful information, about the individual 
small business, than the borrower(s). Meanwhile, existing literature has also 
acknowledged that the converse may be the case for new businesses, where lenders are 
supposed to have more information than the new entrepreneurs, on the prospects of the 
businesses. This is because new entrepreneurs many have a tendency towards being over-
optimistic about their prospects (Fraser and Greene, 2006). The majority of existing 
studies, however, have focused on the case where banks have less information than 
borrowers when making lending decisions. Especially, it has been recognised that the 
asymmetric information is more serious in smaller businesses than in larger firms (Ang, 
1991).  
The empirical implications of asymmetric information are important. Firstly, 
creditworthy small business borrowers may under invest if they cannot raise the capital 
7they need and/or at a price they should pay. Secondly, non-creditworthy small business 
borrowers may over invest if their loan applications are mistakenly approved by lenders 
because of the problem of information asymmetries. Theoretical models have been 
developed to capture the empirical implications of asymmetric information, such as the 
capital rationing model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), signalling model (Bester, 1985) and 
sorting by signally and self-selection paradigm (Han et al., 2009a). It has been argued that 
banks may alleviate information asymmetries by collecting private information about the 
borrowers and use the information collected in their lending decision makings (Diamond, 
1991). Hence, relationship banking would reduce information asymmetries and lower the 
costs of lending for banks (Chakravarty and Scott, 1999).  
Through the services and products used by small business borrowers, banks can collect 
information which is not directly available, from financial statements for instance. It has 
been generally accepted that relationship banking has strong impacts on the problems 
associated with information asymmetries. The value of relationship banking, in terms of 
alleviating the problem of asymmetric information, varies over the nature of lending 
institutions (Berger and Udell, 2002), the nature of the relationship (Lehmann and 
Neuberger, 2001) and the credit market conditions (Han et al, 2009b). It has also been 
acknowledged that relationship banking is playing a less important role for large firms 
than it was because of financialisation (Deeg, 2010). Such impacts are still not clear for 
relationship banking of SMEs. However, it has been widely accepted that financialisation 
has changed business financing behaviour. For example, when there is a demand for 
finance, non-financial businesses tend to choose external finance, rather than adjust their 
production (Milberg, 2008). It has been found that financial expenses take a greater 
fraction of profit for non-financial firms over the last 50 years (Orhangazi, 2008).   
8Recognising the issue of asymmetric data there are some ‘industry practices’ deployed by 
some borrowers, including the providing of ‘private information’ to bankers and leaving 
them to make the decision to support the request for funds (sometimes with conditions), 
or to reject the application. Smith and Smith (2000) discuss the use of ‘signals’ to support 
the validity of bank client requests for assistance. They define a signal as a credible 
demonstration that obviates the need to convey the information itself. Bankers recognise 
such signals as helpful and will use screening techniques, developed by their banks, as 
means of averting the risks of ‘adverse selection’. Smith and Smith (2000) further 
postulate that signalling works in a way that is convincing and still preserves the value of 
the information. This could involve soliciting ‘reassuring statements’ from the bank’s 
client(s) to confirm that they are very committed to the project for which they are 
requesting bank support.  
3. Hypothesis Development 
Pivotal to information asymmetries has been a general conceptual awareness of the 
importance of the relationships, between banks and SMEs, in financing information-
opaque ventures. Indeed, a generally accepted belief is that highly embedded and long-
term relationships play a key role in private information acquisition (Han et al., 2009b) 
and capital provision for SMEs (Ono and Uesugi, 2009). Hence, empirical research has 
used length of relationship as a (reverse) proxy for the degree of asymmetric information 
between banks and ‘informationally opaque’ SME borrowers. However, there is no 
clearly unequivocal evidence supporting the role of embedded banker-SME client 
relationships, in reducing the cost of SME finance. Indeed, empirical evidence has shown 
9that ‘relationship lending’ can reduce the cost of SME finance (Berger and Udell, 1995) 
by improving the quality of information exchanged between lenders and borrowers. 
Nevertheless, private information acquisition based on relationship-lending may yield 
(economic) ‘bank rents’ and as a result lending rates may increase with the length of 
relationship (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Mixed effects of relationship lending have also 
been found in financing small businesses in Belgium (Degryse and Cayseele, 2000). For 
example, it has been found that in Belgium, small business borrowers were charged 
higher rates on loans over the length of relationship, but they were less likely to be 
required to secure the loans by collateral. In the U.K., consistent evidence is available 
from an earlier study (Binks and Ennew, 1997) which examined the nature of the 
relationship between banks and SMEs in the U.K. and argued that relationship lending 
encourages information flow, serving as an alternative to heavy reliance on collateral-
backed lending decisions. More recent empirical studies, by analysing U.K. data, have 
also indicated that length of relationship does not impact the probabilities of being 
denied (Fraser, 2009) but reduces the severity of financial problems faced by SMEs (Han, 
2008). 
Given these potentially contradictory impacts, there is no clearly unequivocal evidence of 
the tangible values of the dyadic relationship. Nonetheless, intuition suggests that longer 
relationships between banks and SMEs should impact favourably on the financial 
situation of the business. 
H1: Longer relationships with banks reduce the probability of facing financial problems 
by SMEs. 
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Apart from the length of relationship, the embeddedness of the relationship between 
banks and borrowers has been recognised to play an important role in private 
information collection. When businesses and banks are connected by arms-length 
network dyadic ties (a low level of embeddedness), businesses tend to transfer public 
knowledge. In contrast, they tend to transfer private knowledge (information) when they 
are linked via embedded ties (high level of embeddedness) (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). 
Indeed, with ‘arms-length’ relationships, market transactions are mediated by both the 
cost of search and the actual cost of goods and services (Uzzi, 1997). There is also ample 
evidence that an ‘arms-length’ relationship is not highly valued in the bank-customer 
nexus (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). From a historical perspective, a contrast is 
often drawn between ‘relationship banking’ and ‘transaction banking’. In a system 
dominated by relationship banking, banks invest a great deal of resources in the 
collection and monitoring of private information and maintain a close, long-term 
relationship with business clients. Whereas, in transaction banking, banks treat each loan 
as a separate transaction and deal with it on its own merits (Baker and Collins, 2003). 
H2: The favourable effects of relationship banking on reducing SME financial problems 
increase over the level of embeddedness of the relationship with bankers. 
Bankers, seemingly, are strongly committed to client relationship development by being 
observed to be actively involved with facilitating the improvement of clients’ financial 
decision-making. Important aspects include the formal provision of support, including 
‘specialist advice’ to their SME clients. Even in a financial system, dominated by 
transaction banking, banks are often willing to provide support and advice for financially 
distressed business clients. There is some interesting debate, in the literature, whether 
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such ‘distressed clients’ actually reflect and respond to the advice given by their banks. 
However, a longitudinal study, of the period 1946-1963, revealed that nearly half of the 
distressed business clients received bank advice and intervention in terms of independent 
investigation and advice on: financial structure, change in management and business 
details (Baker and Collins, 2003). Binks and Ennew (1997) reported that more than 60 
per cent of small businesses in the U.K. are willing to provide information to their bank 
manager and are positively inclined to discuss excess borrowings in advance. By 
conducting cluster analysis they found that such businesses were more inclined to 
appreciate the importance of many aspects of bank services, as well as being more 
positive in their perceptions of bank service quality. In addition, they were less 
constrained (more open) in their relationship with their bank. Basu (1999) also found that 
a large proportion of Asian entrepreneurs approached banks for advice in creating their 
business in the U.K. and half of them found bank advice to be useful. Also available is 
the evidence that there is a weak, or even negative correlation, between taking start up 
counselling and launching/running a business in the future (Dahlqvist et al, 2000; Basu, 
1999). This may result from ‘self-selection’ behaviour of entrepreneurs (Davidsson, 2002). 
H3: ‘Distressed clients’ are more likely to use bank support which will reduce the 
financial difficulties they have.
Trust theory (Ali and Birley, 1998) indicates that ‘trust’ (being reliable and honest) plays 
an important role in the development and maintenance of bank and SME client lasting 
‘portfolio relationships’. As the level of trust increases, the relationship strengthens, and 
the likelihood of trustworthy behaviour increases (Howorth and Moro, 2006). This ‘trust 
begets trust’ hypothesis has also been applied by researchers to gain a deeper 
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understanding of electronic business transfers and online behaviour, where the 
importance of ‘trust’ (Tapscott et al, 2000) has been recognised as both a barrier to 
electronic commerce (Gefen, 2000) and ‘a significant antecedent of customers’ 
willingness to engage in transaction with ‘web-merchants’ (Yousafzai et al, 2003, p. 847).  
H4: The likelihood of using bank support increases over the embededness of the banker-
client relationship.
The importance of entrepreneurial demographics and business characteristics in the use 
of external assistance has also been acknowledged by existing research. It has been found 
that the use of external advice is highly associated with business size, growth, innovation 
activities (Cosh and Hughes, 1998) and the ethnicity of entrepreneur (Basu, 1999). 
Existing literature has acknowledged that the financial constraints faced by SMEs, in 
terms of availability and cost of finance, are significantly influenced by business size (Han, 
2008), stage of business cycle (Berger and Udell, 1998), industry (Petersen and Rajan, 
1995), information transparency (Petersen and Rajan, 2002) and organisation type (Avery 
et al, 1998). Equally, the human capital of an entrepreneur engaged within his/her SME 
also has a strong impact on the financial issues of the business. These demographic 
factors contain ethnicity (Cavalluzzo et al, 2002), experience in business (Cressy, 1996), 
personal wealth (Burke et al, 2000; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) and so on. In banking 
literature, this is referred as the ‘sorting-by-observed-risk’ paradigm (Berger and Udell, 
1990). The above aspects are ones of ‘resource heterogeneity’ that is addressed within the 
‘Resource Based View’ (RBV) of strategic thinking. The RBV being defined by Barney 
and Hesterly (2010, p.95) as ‘An economic theory that suggests that firm performance is a function of 
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the types of resources and capabilities controlled by firms. Resources and capabilities can be categorised 
into: financial, human and organisational resource categories.’ 
More specifically, Fraser (2009) finds that there is no ethnic discrimination in UK SME 
capital markets, in terms of availability and costs of borrowing. Instead, the variation can 
be explained by non-ethnic factors, such as credit history, of the entrepreneurs and 
business borrowers. In an investigation of relationship banking and financial constraint, 
Han (2008) reports that characteristics of entrepreneurs and businesses play an important 
role in the determination of financial conditions. For example, bigger firms and firms 
managed by more experienced owner/managers are less likely to face financial problems. 
The demographics of entrepreneurs are also found to be important for the use of service 
and advices available for SMEs. For example, men and black and minority ethnic 
entrepreneurs are more likely to use family and friends for advice, while women are more 
likely than men to use Business Link (Scott and Irwin, 2009). Therefore, we derive the 
following hypotheses to be tested empirically. 
H5a: Large firms and male and ethnic-minority entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
bank support. 
H5b: Large firms and firms owned by more experienced entrepreneurs are less likely to 
have financial problems. 
In summary, the use of bank support and its impacts on the reduction of financial 
problems faced by SMEs are determined by the length and embeddedness of 
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relationships between banks and their SME clients and the characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and their businesses. 
4. Data and Methodology 
To examine the use of bank support and its impacts on the severity of the financial 
problems faced by SMEs through relationship banking, empirical evidence is drawn from 
the 2004 U.K. Survey of SME finances. This is the first representative survey of SME 
finance in the U.K. to offer a close analysis of businesses with fewer than 250 employees, 
demographics of their owners and access to external finance. The survey was conducted 
amongst a representative sample of 2500 SMEs, representing around 3.6 million small 
and medium sized enterprises, in the U.K. private sector in 2004. This survey has been 
widely used in the recent empirical research on SME finance, such as Fraser (2009), Han 
(2008) and Han and Benson (2010). 
This survey was conducted in the U.K. by Warwick Business School and IFF Research 
Ltd. by Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) in 2004. It is comparable with 
the U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) carried out by the Federal Reserve 
and Small Business Administration, as both of the surveys employed similar data 
collection approaches, e.g. sampling, and asked similar questions. In particular, the U.K. 
survey collected data relating to (1) the relationships between small businesses and their 
finance providers, (2) the types of finance used, (3) credit terms and conditions, (4) start-
up finance, (5) rejection experience, (6) income and balance sheet information and (7) 
business owners’ human and financial capital. Detailed information about the survey and 
general findings are available from Fraser (2005). 
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Fundamentally, the survey collected information on the use of bank support and the 
severity of the financial problems of obtaining sufficient finance and the cost of finance. 
Table 1 lists the main external sources of support and advice used by SMEs when they 
make financial decisions and their usefulness, rated and reported by the respondents, 
ranging from 1 (no help) to 10 (vital help). Nearly 70 per cent of SMEs use external 
support and advice mainly from accountants, bank managers, friends/business associates 
and business advisors. Other sources include solicitors, customers, trade associations, 
and government agencies and so on. Indeed, the need of support and advice provided by 
external sources is perceived helpful for SMEs, ranging from 6.77 (business advisor) to 
7.73 (friends/business associates) out of 10. From the survey, we do not know if a 
sample firm obtains advice/support from accountants internally or externally. Coming 
after the accountant, the bank manager is the second most frequently used external 
source of support and advice, from the survey’s findings.  
Table 1 around here please 
The definitions of the variables, and summary statistics, are reported in Table 2. A 
‘typical’ firm in the sample was family-owned, 26 years old and had 26 employees. It was 
owned by a 51 years old male owner, who had 20 years of experience. As the other 
dependent variable, 50% of the firms are facing financial problems. Existing research has 
highlighted the impacts of the demographics of the entrepreneur, business characteristics, 
relationships with banks, and use of different sources of finance on the financial situation 
of SMEs. This paper follows this approach and groups the independent variables into 
similar categories.  
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Table 2 around here please 
The principal interest of this study is to examine the determinants of use of bank support 
and its impacts on the lessening of financial problems faced by SMEs by conducting 
empirical analysis on the available observations. Correlation matrix is shown as below.  
Table 3 around here please 
To justify our regression modules in the following empirical analysis, we explicitly 
consider the possible multicollinearity problem by Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test3
on all of the empirical models conducted in the next session. The highest is 2.93 which is 
lower than the maximum acceptable value of 5 and therefore there is no multicollinearity 
problem in our empirical models.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. The Use of Bank Support/Advice 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of three Logistic models and the probabilities 
modelled are SUP_BANK=1. Therefore, any factor with a positive coefficient points to a 
higher likelihood of using bank support. Model 1 includes control variables (region and 
industry) and business characteristics only with 1783 samples involved. Model 2 adds 
entrepreneurial demographics with 1584 samples involved and Model 3 also considers 
the relationship between SMEs and banks as well as the banking market conditions 
3 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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defined as locations: whether locates in cities or not (Han et al., 2009b). First 
measurement is the length of the relationship which has been widely used in existing 
literature (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and another is whether ‘clients’ have used 
overdrafts in recent 3 years, according to Berger and Udell (2002). Moreover, there is a 
third measurement as the type of bank, i.e. if the bank is a big-4 bank. Big-4 refers to the 
four biggest commercial banks in U.K., including Lloyds TSB, HSBC, RBS and Barclays 
in 2004. We use this proxy because it is plausible that small ‘relationship oriented’ banks 
are more likely to offer bank support to SMEs than large ‘arm-length’ banks. The results 
suggest that the use of bank support is fundamentally determined by the characteristics 
of business, entrepreneur (H5a) and the type of the bank which provides the majority of 
financial services to the business.  
Table 4 around here please 
Firstly, the embeddedness of relationship could be measured either by the duration of the 
relationship, or scope of the relationship (Degryse and Cayseele, 2000). Table 4 shows 
that the coefficient of length of relationship between a bank and SME clients is positive 
yet statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient of whether the firms has used an 
overdraft in recent 3 years is significantly positive. The seeking of bank support is 
strongly motivated by the demand of external finance and therefore a main reason of 
using bank support is finance-oriented. Thus, H4 is supported by the measurement of 
scope of relationship.  
Secondly, Model 1 reports that larger businesses and those in need of finance have a 
higher likelihood of using bank support. Larger businesses need more support from 
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banks because of their bigger number of transactions with banks (H5a). The latter 
finding suggests that small businesses with financial problems, e.g. those sought new 
finance or discouraged from borrowing, are more likely to use bank support, supporting 
H3. Following the finding above and H3, one could argue that SMEs managed by such 
entrepreneurs are more likely to have financial problems and thus they are more inclined 
to use bank support. We conducted correlation analysis and rejected this argument, as the 
Spearman correlation coefficients between the probability of facing financial problems 
and these demographic factors are small. One possible reason for this can be that the 
behaviour of a SME in seeking external support mimics that of its owner. This is 
especially pertains to the smaller businesses which are often dominated by a single or a 
small number of principal individuals. The link between behaviour (e.g. payment 
technologies) and certain demographics of individuals (e.g. age, gender, education) has 
been highlighted by existing research (e.g. Carow and Staten, 1999; Mantel, 2000). By 
analysing a U.S. small business dataset, Han and Greene (2007) found that characteristics 
of entrepreneurs do have a strong impact on the likelihood of online loan application 
behaviour of small businesses in the U.S.  Moreover, the firm size in Model 1, gender of 
owner in Model 2 and 3, owner ethnic group in Model 2 are all statistically significant. 
Therefore, H5a is supported. 
Model 3 also shows that the coefficient of ‘BIG_FOUR’ is positive and statistically 
significant at a 1% level. This result suggests that SMEs whose main bank is one of big-
four, i.e. the biggest four commercial banks in the U.K., have higher probability of using 
assistance/support from bank managers, than those using financial services from smaller 
banks. There are two possible reasons behind this finding. Firstly, supply of banking 
services heavily concentrate in the big-four in the U.K. For example, in the U.K., 59% of 
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SMEs have just one main provider of finance and big-four are the main bank to 78% of 
SMEs (Fraser, 2005). Secondly, SMEs are inclined to use banking services from large 
banks which provide more comprehensive services and wider networks. 
5.2. Impacts of bank support on the severity of financial problems faced by SMEs 
Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data and the causal relationship between 
SME financial problems and use of bank support, we cannot directly test the impacts of 
bank support on the severity of financial problems faced by SMEs. One possibility to 
overcome such problem is to use instrumental variables which affect financial 
conditional only through bank support. However, such instruments are not available 
from the data and we assume the same set of variables determine both the use of bank 
support and the financial conditions of SMEs. In other words, we cannot simply put the 
bank support variable on the right hand side of the model. Instead, we follow the theory 
of relationship banking (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Uzzi, 1999) to examine how SMEs 
benefits from the use of bank support through relationship banking. Indeed, we expect 
that the favourable effects of relationship banking on the financial condition of SMEs, 
which have been observed in existing literature, e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and 
Berger and Udell (1995), will be further enhanced by the use of bank support. As a result, 
we run three models on all samples (Model 4), non-users (Model 5) and users (Model 6) 
respectively. The probability of having financial problems by SMEs is measured by a 
binary variable whether facing financial problem (1) or not (0) and self-reported by the 
respondent. The basic logistic (Logit) model has been adopted. Any explanatory variable 
with a positive coefficient points to a higher probability of having financial problems.  
Table 5 around here please 
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The first part of Table 5 reports the results of an logit model with all samples (Model 4) 
and shows that the probability of having financial problems faced SMEs are mainly 
determined by three factors: the characteristics of business, those of entrepreneurial and 
the relationship characters between SMEs and banks.  
Empirical literature suggests that start-up businesses may have more problems in access 
finance than more established businesses, because they are more risky and 
informationally opaque (Berger and Udell, 1998). In comparison, our results (Table 5) 
show that start-up businesses are less likely to have financial problems. Table 5 shows 
such effect is inclined to occur on the users of bank support services since the odds ratio 
of start-up business Model 4 (all samples) is 0.5163 while the odds ratio of start-up 
business of bank support users (Model 6) is 0.0594. The relationship between the starting 
up and probability of facing financial problems among non-users of bank support service 
is not statistically significant. Indeed, this result reflects that with the development of the 
business, in terms of starting up for example, a SME will still face the continuing 
problem of raising funds as business progresses and therefore could experience tougher 
financial conditions.   
From the views of the effect of firm characteristics, a firm’s performance affects its 
probability to suffer financial problems. From Table 5, the coefficient of profits/total 
assets is inversely related with the probability of suffering financial problems. It means 
firms earning more profits will be less likely to be financially constrained. Capital 
structure also plays significantly a role, leading to financial problems. From Model 4 and 
Model 5, implications could be drawn that firms with higher financial leverage will be 
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more likely to get financial problems. However, Model 6 also indicates that firms’ capital 
structure does not plays such role if the firm is a user of banking support service.  
As for the characters of entrepreneurs, the factors of gender (female), (young) age of the 
owners have favourable effects on the reduction of probability of facing financial 
problems for non-users (Model 5) and users (Model 6) respectively in Table 5, being 
consistent to intuition. Moreover, for all the samples (Model 4 to Model 6), if the owner 
is more experienced, his/her business will be less likely to suffer from financial problems. 
Such findings are consistent with existing literature, which emphasises the important role 
played by the human capital (Cressy, 1996) and personal financial capital (Ang, et al., 1995) 
of the entrepreneur. It suggests that human capital (e.g. experience in business) has 
strong impacts on the probability of facing financial problems by the business. For 
example, SMEs managed by more experienced entrepreneurs are less likely to face 
financial problems and these favourable effects are statistically significant for all samples 
and non bank users and bank users. There are two important implications to draw from 
these findings. Firstly, it suggests that the characteristics of entrepreneurs have strong 
impacts on the financial situation of their business, supporting H5b. Secondly, for 
entrepreneurs and small business owner managers, business experience plays a more 
important role to overcome financial problem than education.  
Another important result reported in Table 5 is that the probability of financial problems, 
facing by SMEs, is reduced when a longer relationship between a bank and a SME is 
developed, where the negative coefficient is statistically significant in all three models. 
Firstly, this result is consistent with empirical evidence that relationship banking 
improves the availability of finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and reduces the cost of 
22
finance (Berger and Udell, 1990; Peltoniemi, 2007). Thus, it supports H1. Secondly, the 
results suggest that the relationship effect increases over the embeddedness of the 
relationship between banks and SMEs. The embeddedness of relationship can be 
improved by more interactions and interventions between banks and their SME clients, 
in terms of providing support and advice, for instance, if the interactions involve 
considerable information collection. Table 5 shows that the relationship coefficient is 
statistically significant for both bank support users and non users. In particular, the odds 
ratio of the estimate of ‘relationship’ for bank support users is 0.75 while that of the non-
users of bank support is 0.81. It means for the bank support users, relationship will value 
more on reducing financial problems, than the non-users. Therefore, it supports H2. 
To present the favourable relationship effects on reducing financial difficulties, we plot 
the estimated probabilities of having financial problems (Figure 1) over the length of 
relationship developed between banks and SMEs. The estimation is based on the results 
of parsimonious models on the probability of financial problems (Models 5 and 6, Table 
5). There are three important implications shown in the figures. Firstly, these figures 
show that bank support users always have lower (higher) likelihood of having (no) 
financial problems. Secondly, by developing longer relationships, the likelihood of having 
(no) financial problems decreases (increases). Finally, the favourable relationship effects 
on reducing financial difficulties are more significant, or have greater marginal effects, for 
bank support users than non users. 
Figure 1 around here please 
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6. Summary, conclusions and implications 
This paper examines the use of bank support/advice and its impacts on the financial 
problems faced by SMEs. It contributes to literature in a number of beneficial ways. 
Firstly, as a complement to the existing literature on relationship banking which has been 
focused from the perspective of banks (e.g. Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Baker and Collins, 
2003), as this paper studies the use and impacts of bank support from the perspective of 
small and medium sized businesses in the U.K. It also complements empirical political 
studies on the use and effectiveness of public support programme by examining the 
assistance provided by private sectors, the banks. Secondly, this paper further highlights 
the importance of the demographic characteristic of the entrepreneurs in taking up 
external assistance and in the determination of the financial conditions of their 
businesses. This is a unique characteristic which distinguishes small business finance 
from traditional corporate finance. Meanwhile, our results also suggest that there is a 
substitution relationship between external assistance (support and advice) and the human 
capital of the entrepreneurs engaged within their business. Thirdly, the empirical results 
of this paper suggest that the nature of relationship banking has strong impacts on the 
financial problems faced by SMEs. The use of bank support increases the level of 
embeddedness of the relationship between banks and their SME clients. Improved 
relationships can significantly reduce the probability of financial problems faced by SMEs. 
Finally, banks are very important institutions in national and regional economies and 
provide considerable critical support to small and medium sized enterprises. UK 
Government concern for the level of banking service efficacy is reflected in an 
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investigation, that was started in March 2000, by the Competition Commission (2002). 
The report came to a number of conclusions and put forward a number of specific 
recommendations for the monopolistic clearing banks to implement. The report 
recognised (inter alia) that the quality of service the SME sector receives from their banks 
and the terms on which it is provided are key factors in the success of this sector. Our 
survey data was captured in 2004 and may reflect the benefit, for some SME clients, 
from some of those recommendations implemented by the banks. This specific aspect 
cannot be specifically derived from our dataset, but some improvements in SME banking 
services will have improved in the intervening two years between 2004 and 2002. 
However, because of the cross-sectional nature of our data, we are not able to investigate 
the effects of the policy change and we call for a future research with panel data to 
further look at this issue. 
The results revealed in this paper provide empirical evidence that banks do provide 
helpful support to their SME clients and such support significantly reduces the financial 
problems faced by SMEs. This study also reveals that the support, provided to SMEs 
from banks, is considered valuable by a high number of entrepreneurs. It implies that by 
seeking assistance from banks would possibly improve the ‘surviving ability’ of SMEs 
who face financial problems. We find the important role played by the human capital of 
the entrepreneur engaged within the businesses, in reducing the financial problems faced 
by SMEs, consistent with Cressy’s (1996) conclusion that small businesses failed because 
of the lack of human capital, rather than the lack of finance. 
Our results also suggest that favourable effects of bank support work through 
relationship banking. This is consistent with the empirical evidence which suggests that 
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relationship banking would alleviate the asymmetric information problem between banks 
and SME customers. Through providing support and advice to their SME clients, bank 
managers, over time, increase the depth of embeddedness of the relationships with SME 
customers. Thus information quality is potentially improved in such a developing dyadic 
relationship, between banks and their clients. Our empirical data supports a view that 
relationship lending is highly beneficial from the banker-client perspective. In conclusion, 
SME proprietors should recognise the importance and value of the support they could 
receive from the banking community and should ensure they develop these pivotal trust-
based network relationships within their relationship portfolio. Banks are known 
providers of considerable funding, as well as business advice to SMEs and therefore, for 
a SME, the ability to access external knowledge resources efficiently can become a 
competitive factor (Viljamaa, 2011). For policy makers, it is important to provide a 
greater level of business support for SMEs in difficulties, to lower the level of business 
failure. Our paper has disclosed the nature of service provided by banks, only in broad 
terms. It is conceivable that banks might move more into traditional consultancy areas 
such as providing advice on tax planning and retirement planning to SMEs. If this is the 
case then future academic research could study the levels of client satisfaction across 
clusters of expert services provided. 
Comment [L.Han1]: Make sure this is 
correct. DONE 
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Table 1: The main external source of support and advice used by SMEs and its 
usefulness 
The usefulness of support/advice is reported by the respondents, ranging from 1 
to 10, where 1 means no help and 10 means vital help. 
Source of support Usefulness of support
Frequency Percent Mean Std. Dev.
accountant 914 36.6 7.71 1.97
bank manager 482 19.3 7.50 1.88
friends/business associates 111 4.4 7.73 2.56
business adviser 75 3.0 6.77 2.44
other sources 129 5.2 7.28 2.03
no advice or support used 678 27.1
don't know/null 111 4.4
Total 2500 100.0
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Table 2: Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Total number of observations is 2500. Descriptive statistics for control variables are not reported here but available on request. Control variables include eleven dummies 
representing the region where sample firm headquarters, eight industry variables based on two-digit SIC code. Firm age has a range of zero to 504 and a mean around 27. 
Nearly 4% of the samples are older than 100 years and 11 firms are older than 200. One sample firm reported that the principle owner had 100 years of experience in 
business. To examine the influence of the ‘anomalies’, empirical models were run twice by including and excluding these outliers.  
Variable Definition Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS
SUP_BANK Whether use bank support 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
TOTEMP Total number of employees 1 240 26.16 10 39.60 
LOGTOTEMP Natural log value of one plus total number of employees 0.69 5.48 2.42 2.40 1.36 
LEVERAGE Gearing ratio: total liabilities / total business assets 0 9010000 577.43 0.31 19738.39 
LOGLEVERAGE Natural log value of one plus gearing ratio 0 13.71 0.40 0.27 0.77 
FAM_BUS Family business (0,1) 0 1 0.81 1 0.40 
STARTUP Startup business (0,1): =<2 years old 0 1 0.06 0 0.24 
FAGE Firm age in years 0 504 25.93 16 35.71 
LOGFAGE Natural log value of one plus firm age in years 0 6.22 2.81 2.83 0.99 
NEED_FIN In need of finance (0,1) 0 1 0.59 1 0.49 
PROF Profit/Total Assets -25.44 81.05 0.23 0.10 1.98 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTREPRENEUR
OAGE Principal owner age in years 18 85 50.90 51 10.42 
LOGOAGE Natural log value of one plus principal owner age in years 2.94 4.45 3.93 3.95 0.21 
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Table 2: Continued 
Variable Definition Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev. 
MALE Principal owner’s gender: male (0,1) 0 1 0.82 1 0.38 
ETHNIC_W Principal owner’s ethnicity: white (0,1) 0 1 0.96 1 0.20 
EDUC_AU Education: above undergraduate degree (0,1) 0 1 0.23 0 0.42 
EXP Principal owner’s experience in businesses in years 0 100 20.87 20 11.60 
LOGEXP Natural log value of one plus number of years of experience 0 4.62 2.90 3.04 0.70 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANK AND SME
RELATION Length of relationship in years with main bank 0 99 16.16 12 15.57 
LOGRELATION Natural log value of one plus length of relationship 0 4.61 2.44 2.56 0.96 
BIG_FOUR The main bank is one of big-4 (0,1) 0 1 0.79 1 0.41 
OVERDRA Whether use overdraft in recent 3 years (0,1) 0 1 0.66 1 0.47 
MARKET CONDITIONS
MSA Locate in cities (0,1) 0 1 0.28 0 0.45 
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS FACED BY SME
FINANPROB Whether facing financial problem 0 1 0.50 0 0.50 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 FINANPROB 1.00 
2 LOGTOTEMP 0.06* 1.00 
3 FAM_BUS -0.02 -0.30* 1.00 
4 STARTUP 0.03 -0.08* -0.02 1.00 
5 LOGFAGE -0.08* 0.19* -0.03 -0.56* 1.00 
6 LOGOAGE -0.09* 0.05* 0.03 -0.21* 0.35* 1.00 
7 MALE 0.03 0.18* -0.09* -0.11* 0.12* 0.10* 1.00 
8 ETHNIC_W 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.07* 0.07* -0.03 1.00 
9 EDU_AU 0.06* 0.11* -0.12* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.07* 1.00 
10 LOGEXP -0.09* 0.11* 0.05* -0.29* 0.42* 0.60* 0.21* 0.04 -0.06* 1.00 
11 LOGRELATION -0.10* 0.04* 0.04 -0.36* 0.55* 0.35* 0.10* 0.07* 0.00 0.42* 1.00 
12 BIG_FOUR 0.03 0.05* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04* -0.04* 0.02 0.01 0.11* 1.00 
13 MSA 0.02 0.13* -0.16* 0.00 -0.06* -0.03 0.03 -0.13* 0.18* -0.04* -0.05* -0.04* 1.00 
14 OVERDRA 0.19* 0.24* -0.09* -0.08* 0.07* -0.02 0.09* -0.02 0.04 0.08* 0.04 0.04* 0.03 1.00 
15 PROF -0.05* -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.06* -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.00 1.00 
16 LOGLEVERAGE 0.12* 0.11* -0.09* 0.07* -0.09* -0.05* 0.00 -0.01 0.05* -0.05* -0.06* 0.03 0.06* 0.08* -0.02 1.00 
17 SUP_BANK 0.08* 0.06* -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.04* 0.07* -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.06* -0.03 0.15* -0.01 0.03 1.00 
18 NEED_FIN 0.19* 0.23* -0.08* 0.11* -0.12* -0.12* 0.06* -0.01 0.02 -0.08* -0.25* -0.01 0.03 0.26* -0.02 0.09* 0.08* 1.00 
Note: * denotes a statistical significance level of 5% or lower. 
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Table 4: Use of Bank Support 
The models employed are Logistic. The probability modelled is SUP_BANK=1, i.e. bank is the main external 
source of support and advice used when SMEs face financial problems. Not reported here are the results 
of control variables (but available from the authors on request), including regional and industry dummies. 
Model 1 includes control variables (region and industry) and business characteristics. Model 2 adds 
entrepreneurial demographics and Model 3 also considers the relationships between SMEs and banks. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
CONSTANT -2.0196*** 0.3949 -0.3073 1.4148 -1.7037 1.4602 
LOGTOTEMP 0.0985** 0.0500 0.0643 0.0554 0.0366 0.0570 
FAM_BUS 0.0339 0.1590 -0.0499 0.1744 -0.0033 0.1777 
STARTUP -0.2311 0.4076 -0.2475 0.4188 -0.2378 0.4312 
LOGFAGE 0.0405 0.0718 0.0455 0.0833 0.0764 0.0902 
NEED_FIN 0.4374*** 0.1308 0.4866*** 0.1419 0.3110** 0.1494 
PROF -0.0049 0.0320 0.0305 0.1472 0.0845 0.1519 
LOGLEVERAGE 0.0625 0.0712 0.1133 0.0753 0.1048 0.0775 
LOGOAGE   -0.3177 0.3995 -0.1268 0.4079 
MALE   0.4415** 0.2022 0.4048** 0.2054 
ETHNIC_W   -0.5196* 0.3111 -0.5140 0.3184 
EDUC_AU   -0.0799 0.1597 -0.0710 0.1639 
LOGEXP   -0.0805 0.1340 -0.1440 0.1379 
LOGRELATION     -0.0561 0.0886 
OVERDRA     0.9877*** 0.1755 
BIG_FOUR     0.5130*** 0.1992 
MSA     -0.1685 0.1633 
No. of Observations
Log Likelihood 
LR Chi2 
Prob>Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
1783
-891.4679 
40.70 
0.0332 
0.0223 
1584
-779.7912 
50.87 
0.0137 
0.0316 
1573
-751.3765 
97.23 
0.0000 
0.0608 
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Table 5: Probabilities of having financial problems: restricted specifications 
The models employed are Logistic. . The probability modelled is FINANPROBM=1, i.e. The firm has 
faced financial problems. Not reported here are the results of control variables (but available on request), 
including regional and industry dummies. Model 4 includes all the samples. Model 5 includes all of the 
firms seeking external source of support and advice from banks. Model 6 5 includes all of the firms not 
seeking external source of support and advice from banks. ***, **, and * denote statistical significant level of 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Model 4 (All Samples) Model 5 (Non-users) Model 6 (Users)
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
CONSTANT -0.7701 1.2065 -0.6681 1.3741 -5.4163* 3.2553 
LOGTOTEMP -0.0461 0.0478 -0.0697 0.0551 -0.0347 0.1211 
FAM_BUS 0.1851 0.1505 0.1722 0.1756 0.3065 0.3749 
STARTUP -0.6611* 0.3688 -0.3312 0.4160 -2.8230** 1.0951 
LOGFAGE -0.0615 0.0770 -0.1268 0.0910 0.2035 0.1827 
PROF -0.6020*** 0.1639 -0.3968** 0.1833 -1.2840*** 0.4947 
LOGLEVERAGE 0.3683*** 0.1166 0.4655*** 0.1461 0.1370 0.2435 
LOGOAGE 0.2861 0.3372 0.2547 0.3815 1.6326* 0.9247 
MALE 0.1239 0.1559 0.2979* 0.1765 -0.2137 0.4311 
ETHNIC_W 0.3370 0.2852 0.4878 0.3498 0.1636 0.6537 
EDUC_AU 0.1958 0.1337 0.2162 0.1543 0.3517 0.3471 
LOGEXP -0.3577*** 0.1178 -0.3056** 0.1345 -0.7631** 0.3194 
OVERDRA 0.9758*** 0.1235 0.9970*** 0.1382 0.4700 0.3882 
LOGRELATION -0.2047*** 0.0737 -0.2153** 0.0883 -0.2817* 0.1677 
BIG_FOUR 0.1507 0.1528 0.1167 0.1727 -0.1986 0.4349 
MSA 0.0322 0.1323 0.0940 0.1514 -0.1921 0.3420 
No. of Observations 
Log Likelihood 
LR Chi2 
Prob>Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
1576 
-1003.3339 
176.55 
0.0000 
0.0809 
1196 
-756.6151 
144.30 
0.0000 
0.0871 
320 
-179.7127 
63.97 
0.0014 
0.1511 
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Figure 1: Estimated Probabilities of Suffering Financial Problem 
over    Length of Relationship Banking for SMEs 
(Controlling other variables at mean value for continuous 
variables or median value for binary variables excluding length 
of relationship banking) 
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